





The United States of America (US) and individual
European Union (EU) countries have weighed indi-
vidual liberty and collective protection quite differ-
ently in establishing limits for their internal econom-
ic market arrangements and in forming public poli-
cies aimed at reducing their population’s economic
risks. What will ultimately drive the debate about
“what flexicurity will mean for future EU labor mar-
ket policies” is the more fundamental question of
how individual EU countries’ historical “liberty vs.
social protection” equilibriums will be reconciled
within a fully integrated EU marketplace.A market-
place that itself will have to adjust to an increasingly
integrated world economy.
What strikes an American about the EU flexicurity
debate is its failure to explicitly recognize what is
known in the US as the “state”vs.“federal”debate – a
debate that has been raging among us for well over 200
years. The debate about what it means to be both an
American and a citizen of one of our 50 states. Hence
the typical examples in the flexicurity literature show
how a specific country – Denmark, the Netherlands,
etc.– moved “on the margin”to make their labor mar-
ket somewhat more flexible, while maintaining or not
greatly changing their politically established level of
social insurance protection and its within country dis-
tributional consequences. (For example: European
Commission 2006; Gazier 2006; Madsen 2006.)
The emphasis is on how a given EU country’s social
institutions have been made “more efficient” in
response to external market forces or internal demo-
graphic forces that required some adjustment to its
social contract.There has been little consideration of
the relevance of these within-country adjustment
examples to the ultimate across-country adjustments
to come. Coming, at least in an EU where individual
country labor and all other factor and product mar-
kets are as open across EU countries as are the
50 individual state markets that make up the com-
mon US market. This lack of investigation of how
the US resolved its flexicurity issues while integrat-
ing its 50 states into a single US marketplace is sur-
prising. Since capturing the productivity gains from
fully integrating its individual country markets is
presumably the growth engine that will make the
whole of EU growth greater than the sum of its indi-
vidual country parts. And, will best position the EU
to thrive in a more integrated world economy.
From my perspective,it is likely that the more fully EU
country markets are integrated into a single EU mar-
ketplace, the more EU country social institutions will
need to be integrated to encompass at least some min-
imum level of social protection for its now more het-
erogeneous populations. Therefore, the right question
to ask is:“What will an EU system of social institutions
look like that, like the US, is founded on the proposi-
tion that social cohesion and solidarity do not stop at
each state’s border but encompass all EU citizens?”
More appropriately comparing economic inequality
in the US and the EU
The US social model is often dismissed by
Europeans who argue that US inequality and labor
market flexibility levels (lack of social cohesion and
social solidarity) are so extreme that its social insti-
tution building offers no insight to policymakers
laboring to achieve EU flexicurity. But comparing
the US to any single EU country is like comparing
apples to oranges, or perhaps better an apple to a
mixed bag of fruit. While there is greater inequality
in the US than in most individual EU countries,
Alber (2006) shows that differences in the level of
economic well-being along most dimensions (in-
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come, employment, health, poverty, etc.) across EU
countries is wide enough that US economic out-
comes lie well within EU country extremes.1 Hence,
in comparing social outcomes between the US and
the EU or rather an EU striving to have its market-
place as fully integrated across member states as the
US, it is important to consider the social institutions
that such an economic integration are likely to bring.
Measuring income inequality 
The EU as a whole is closer to the US in both size and
heterogeneity of geography and population than is
any one EU country.The same is true with respect to
comparisons of income inequality. Beblo and Knaus
(2001) demonstrate the importance of across-country
inequality in the EU by tabulating the income distri-
bution of the combined populations of the ten found-
ing EU countries as well as the percentage of each
decile of the distribution originating in each country.
In 1995, those living in Germany made up 28.9 per-
cent of the total EU-10 population but a dispropor-
tionately higher 42.0 percent of the top decile and a
disproportionately lower 20.1 percent of the bottom
decile. In contrast, those living in Portugal made up
3.5 percent of the total EU population but 1.4 percent
of the top decile and 10.6 percent of the bottom
decile. Likewise, those living in Italy made up 20.1
percent of the entire EU-10 population but 9.3 per-
cent of the top and 26.2 percent of the bottom decile.
Accounting for such cross-country differences
increases measured inequality in the entire EU-10.
They find that there is a wide range of inequality
across countries, with Portugal (highest inequality)
having measured inequality 75 percent larger than the
Netherlands (least inequality). Once they make the
necessary calculations, the variation across countries
contributes 9.3 percent to total EU-10 inequality.
Most recently, Brandolini 2007 compares the EU-
wide income distribution in 2000 for the EU-15 and
EU-25 with the income distribution of the US in
2000. He shows inequality (based on a Gini calcula-
tion) within the EU-25, with its greater heterogene-
ity of populations, is substantially greater (0.378)
than for the EU-15 (0.294) and that US income
inequality (0.369) is within them.2
The US began its struggle to establish a set of princi-
ples that would ensure social cohesion when, as a
confederation of 13 states (some free and some
slave), it formally united in 1789. It has continued to
adapt them as it expanded its geographical borders
to 50 states and opened each to more ethnically and
culturally diverse populations.Today, the US contin-
ues to be much larger and more heterogeneous geo-
graphically, ethnically and culturally than any single
EU country. But it is much closer in size, geography,
ethnicity and culture to the entire population of the
EU-25.Comparing the two,EU-25 citizens are about
as unequally distributed across their income distrib-
ution as are US citizens, but their mean real income
is substantially smaller.
As the country level marketplaces of the confeder-
ation of EU-25 countries become more fully inte-
grated, it is likely that average real EU income will
rise and that average incomes across EU countries
will narrow,especially so,given the proposition that
social cohesion and solidarity do not stop at each
state’s border.But it is hard to believe that the wide
differences in the levels of social protections cur-
rently existing across its member countries will be
maintained. The question then becomes what will
be the level of social protection offered to all EU
citizens?
This is the reality that confronts EU policymakers as
they seek a set of social policies which will move a
still relatively loose confederation of nation states
towards a united Europe.In so doing,member states
will be forced to confront the broader regional, eth-
nic, cultural and religious differences that have
shaped US social policies in our efforts to both
reduce inequality and raise living standards for the
entire population.
Because cultures have varied so significantly in the
US across states and regions, our collective national
policies have tolerated greater differences than is the
case in the more homogeneous societies of any given
EU country. Our national policy is one that specifi-
cally allows for deviations at the state and local level.
Moreover, national policies that redistribute
resources across regions and states required collec-
tive approval. No doubt, this has also limited the
extent of that redistribution. Nonetheless, to accom-
modate the broad regional and national differences
that exist across the EU countries, it appears likely
that policy formation will evolve in a manner that is
bounded by similar considerations. In the context of
1 See Alber and Gilbert (in press) for a richer comparison of US
and EU country social models and their economic outcomes.
2 See Burkhauser and Couch (in press) for a more detailed com-
parison of income equality between the US and EU countries over
the last two decades. See Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins and Larrimore
(2008) for a discussion of measurement issues in cross-national
comparisons of US income inequality trends.earnings and income inequality, one challenge to a
united EU is convincing citizens of its member states
that reduction of income inequality in the united EU
that requires redistribution across national bound-
aries is in their collective interest. Similarly, it is also
likely that the extent of generosity in the approval of
income redistributions across borders will be tem-
pered by the interests of the member states just as it
has been in the US.
These same “state” vs. “federal” issues will deter-
mine what it means to be both an EU citizen and a
citizen of one of its member states (and the rights
and responsibilities that go with each) and they are
inescapably part of the flexibility debate. Given the
more heterogeneous EU-25 population over which
these decisions will be made, it is likely that EU
social policies will evolve more toward those of the
US than to the current policies of the more homoge-
neous individual EU countries from which most flex-
icurity examples are drawn.Hence it is useful to con-
sider the foundation of US flexicurity.
The cornerstone of solitary and flexicurity in
the US
“Anyone who works hard and plays by the rules
shouldn’t live in poverty.”
President William Jefferson Clinton,1993 Inaugural
Address (Clinton and Gore 1992)
Most working-age Americans support themselves
and their households through market work. His-
torically economic growth has boosted the living
standards of nearly all working American house-
holds. In President Clinton’s words, working-age
Americans, who have “worked hard and played by
the rules,” not only avoided poverty, but have expe-
rienced substantial increases in economic well-being.
The key to understanding American flexicurity is our
emphasis on employment as the path to economic
success and our reluctance to directly regulate wages
or working conditions so as not to interfere with how
workers and their agents (unions) negotiate with
employers.
The relative use of the federal minimum wage and
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) as mecha-
nisms to ensure that “anyone who works hard and
plays by the rules doesn’t live in poverty” provides a
useful example of how American style flexicurity has
evolved over time. Social reformers of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century confronted by an
emerging capitalist system saw direct government
regulation of labor markets as the best means of
insuring a living wage for all (Ryan 1906). In an era
without state or federal income taxes (and hence
small revenue bases), without labor unions, and with
few government programs to provide income assis-
tance for the working poor, early state minimum
wage and hours laws sought to ensure a minimum
income for the households of all workers via regula-
tory boards of “social partners” (government, labor
and management).The laws were intended to direct-
ly intervene in the marketplace by establishing a set
of socially just hourly wage rates. But most such
efforts by state legislatures in the early twentieth
century were ruled unconstitutional.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 established
the first federal minimum wage.This act marked the
culmination of a long struggle to establish that state
and federal legislatures could regulate the “freedom
to contract” in the marketplace, found in the four-
teenth amendment of the US Constitution. But the
act steered clear of the “corporate state”type of reg-
ulatory boards that still attempt to directly influence
market outcomes and through that intervention the
economic well-being of their citizens. Instead, the
Fair Labor Standards Act simply set one national
minimum hourly wage that applied to all states and
could be raised as appropriate by Congress. Each
state was then free to increase its own minimum
wage law above the Federal minimum hourly wage.
Instead of direct intervention in the labor market to
affect employment contracts,US social reforms have
primarily left it to workers and their agents (unions)
to negotiate these contracts within relatively unre-
strictive government minimum wage, maximum
hours, and workplace safety and environmental reg-
ulations. The result is that wage inequality is much
greater in the US than in most EU countries but
employment is higher and movement into and out of
the labor force, and across employers within a state
and across states is greater.
While the American social safety net protects those
not expected to work – children, aged, disabled –
President Clinton captures the board outline of the
“social contract” as understood by the majority of
voting Americans in his proclamation that anyone
who works hard and plays by the rules shouldn’t be
poor. But he also provides the boundary of that pro-
tection by implicitly agreeing that anyone who does-
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n’t work hard and play by the rules cannot depend
on government support – there are no guaranteed
social minimums in the US. In an American popula-
tion diverse in regional concerns, race, ethnicity, cul-
ture and religion, and one that has historically been
willing to accept various waves of new immigrants
both across our states and over our national borders,
it is this common willingness to provide government
support (via redistribution from higher to lower
income households) to those who are willing to work
that underpins our sense of solidarity. And, it is the
expectation of social mobility,given this social insur-
ance rule, which binds us together.
But rather than making “work pay”by directly man-
dating employers to provide a living wage – in May
2008 the Australian Fair Pay Commission (2008)
found that the minimum wage in the US was the
tenth highest among the 14 OECD countries with
minimum hourly wages, and less than one-half that
of the three highest countries based on either nomi-
nal exchange rates or purchasing power parity:
Luxembourg (EUR 9.29), France (EUR 8.63) and
the Netherlands (EUR 8.33) – the US (USD 5.85)
has chosen to directly subsidize the working poor via
our tax system.3
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, passed by a Republican
dominated Congress, signed by President Clinton,
and reauthorized in 2006, fundamentally altered the
way America provides social protection to single
mothers. It ended a federal program of guaranteed
cash support for single mothers living outside the
mainstream economy (Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children) and replaced it with a federally
funded state-based program of temporary support,
pro-work incentives, and a federal commitment to
make work pay (Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families). In so doing, it encouraged single mothers
to invest in themselves, engage in the labor market
and break the cycle of public benefits and poverty.
Essentially, welfare reform reclassified a population
heretofore “not expected to work” – single mothers
– to one “expected to work”: This package of 1996
welfare reforms is an example of an American style
political compromise that both dramatically reduced
the number of single mothers on the welfare rolls
after 1996 (from around five million before welfare
reform to under two million today), but even more
dramatically increased their employment so that on
average their income rose and their poverty rates fell
(Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Blank 2002; Burk-
hauser, Daly, Larrimore and Kwok 2008).
The primary positive incentive offered to single
mothers who worked was the EITC. It provided
them with a substantial wage subsidy. It is the pri-
mary federal cash transfer paid to the vast majority
of never-married single mothers who now work.
The EITC effectively raised the minimum wage for
single mothers and has played a large role in their
movement into the labor force. In addition to the
Federal EITC, in 19 states, those eligible for the
federal EITC also receive additional state EITC
benefits (Schmeiser 2008). The dramatic improve-
ment in the employment and income of never-mar-
ried single mothers in the US since 1996 was the
result of a policy change that raised the effective
wage of low-skilled workers (Meyer and Rosen-
baum 2001). But unlike a minimum wage increase,
the EITC did not do so by mandating that employ-
ers raise the wages they pay to poor and non-poor
workers alike. Hence, this policy has none of the
negative employment effects of minimum wage
increases on employment and on net has increased
employment and total hours worked of single
mothers (Hotz and Scholz 2003).
As the EU struggles to find the mix of marketplace
flexibility and social protection consistent with fully
integrating its individual EU country labor markets
into a single EU labor market, it will also have to
establish the basis for a compatible set of social
institutions that will protect the economic security
of all its workers. Making that choice is likely to
eventually require substantial changes in each EU
country’s mix of current employment protection
legislation and social welfare protection. That is,
each country to some degree will have to change
from a flexicurity system originally established to
satisfy the needs of its more homogeneous popula-
tion to a flexicurity system that better reflects the
willingness of its population to protect and redis-
tribute income across a more diverse EU popula-
tion. Perhaps when the smoke clears and each EU
country has finally agreed to some common basis
for each of their flexicurity systems that is compat-
ible with a common EU marketplace, ensuring that
EU citizens who work hard and play by the rules do
not live in poverty, may not be seen as such a mea-
ger standard after all.
3 See Neumark and Wascher (2008) for a comprehensive review of
minimum wage legislation on the employment and poverty rates of
low skilled workers.References
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